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Over the last few years a growing number of contributions have shown that the presence 
of business groups, i.e. sets of firms legally distinct but belonging to the same owner(s), 
is significant. From a theoretical point of view, this presence poses the question of 
whether the group or the single legal unit should be considered as the elementary unit in 
economic analysis: i.e., what is generally meant in microeconomic theory by ‘firm’. In 
this paper we consider the group as the appropriate unit to delimit the firm’s boundary, 
i.e. as the ‘observed’ organizational form adopted by firms when they grow in size. 
Starting from this hypothesis, the main aim of this paper is to analyse the role of 
structural variables, such as spatial agglomeration and technology, in determining some 
features of business groups’ strategy and organization. Specifically, the analysis 
concerns the presence and organizational specificity of business groups based on their 
membership of industrial districts (as a proxy for spatial agglomeration) and to the role 
of spatial agglomeration and technology in vertical integration strategies. To conduct 
the analysis, we take advantage of a new and large data-set at firm and business group 
level, recently developed by ISTAT (the Italian National Statistical Institute). The data-
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1. Introduction  
Over the last few years a growing number of contributions have shown that the 
presence of business groups, i.e. sets of firms legally distinct but belonging to the same 
owner(s), is significant. This phenomenon is not specific to large firms and to the 
Italian economy, but is widespread among small and medium-sized firms (SME) and 
in other industrialised countries (Barca et al., 1994; Balloni and Iacobucci, 1997; Rosa 
and Scott, 1999; Loiseau, 2001; Brioschi et al., 2002). 
From a theoretical point of view, the presence of business groups poses the 
question of whether the group or the single legal unit should be considered as the 
elementary unit in economic analysis: i.e., what is generally meant in microeconomic 
theory by ‘firm’. Recent contributions have shown that this question cannot be 
answered in a completely general way (Iacobucci, 2004). However, in most cases, the 
business group can be assimilated to a multidivisional firm (M-form) where the central 
direction (the ultimate owner) is responsible for deciding the resources to be allocated 
to existing divisions (firms) and when they should be opened (set up or acquired) or 
closed (liquidated or sold).  
In this paper we consider the group as the appropriate unit to delimit the firm’s 
boundary, i.e. as the ‘observed’ organizational form adopted by firms when they grow 
in size. Indeed, the characteristics of the legal units belonging to a group can be used to 
analyse some aspects of the firm’s growth strategies and organization, such as 
specialization, spatial concentration, vertical integration, etc. Starting from this 
hypothesis, the main aim of this paper is to analyse the role of structural variables, 
such as spatial agglomeration and technology, in determining some features of 
business groups’ strategy and organization. Specifically, the analysis concerns the 
presence and organizational specificity of business groups based on their membership 
of industrial districts (as a proxy for spatial agglomeration) and to the role of spatial 
agglomeration and technology in vertical integration strategies.  
To conduct the analysis, we take advantage of a new and large data-set at firm and 
business group level, recently developed by ISTAT (the Italian National Statistical 
Institute). The data-set, referring to 2001, covers all manufacturing firms organized as 
joint-stock companies.    3
The paper is organized as follows. In section two we briefly discuss our decision to 
take the business group as the observed firms’ organizational form; we then examine 
the relationships between agglomeration, technology and firm strategy and 
organization and develop the hypotheses to be empirically tested. Section three 
describes the characteristics of the data-set and discusses the empirical evidence of the 
presence and organizational specificity of business groups in industrial districts, by 
industries and Pavitt sectors. The econometric analysis aimed at detecting the joint 
impact of agglomeration and technology on vertical integration strategy is presented. 
Finally, section four presents the main conclusions.  
2. Related literature  
2.1  Business groups as an organizational form 
The phenomenon of business groups is not limited to particular firm sizes, 
industries or countries. Indeed, recent empirical literature has shown that it is the 
organizational form normally adopted by firms when growing in size; i.e. when 
entrepreneurs or managers expand their control over business activities (Barca et al., 
1994; Rosa and Scott, 1999; Loiseau, 2001). As a result, almost all the larger firms and a 
significant share of SMEs in the Italian economy are organized as business groups 
(Brioschi et al., 2002; Iacobucci, 2002).  
Given the definition of business groups as a set of legally distinct units controlled 
by the same owner, several classifications have been proposed, the most common one 
being pyramidal and joint groups. The first is similar to a multidivisional firm in which 
there is a firm at the top and several layers of controlled companies while joint groups 
occur when several firms share minority crossholdings (and often some members of 
the boards of directors), which allows them to coordinate their strategies. The latter 
organization is particularly widespread among Japan’s largest firms. However, 
because in this type of group it is not possible to identify a unitary control, they do not 
fit our definition of a business group. Thus, we focus here on pyramidal groups.  
Most of the literature on business groups is devoted to justifying why pyramidal 
groups exist and comparing the behaviour and performance of business groups with   4
those of independent firms. This literature has mainly focused on financial aspects 
(Brioschi et al., 1990; Gerlach, 1997; Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2004). The pyramidal 
group is regarded as a financial mechanism to minimize the amount of capital needed 
by the ultimate owner to control business activities; i.e. as a mechanism to separate 
control rights, concentrated in the hand of the vertex, from cash flow rights, dispersed 
among the minority shareholders of the companies belonging to the group.  
There is an important strand of literature focussed on organizational issues in 
pyramidal groups (Goto, 1982; Kester, 1982). Following the transaction cost perspective 
this literature considers the group as an organizational intermediary between the 
internal hierarchy and the market. The main aim of these authors is to explain why the 
relationships between companies belonging to business groups can be more efficient 
than those observed in integrated firms or than market transactions between 
independent firms. Within this approach, business groups are assimilated to a 
multidivisional firm where the controlling owner’s role is to allocate resources to 
existing firms and to decide whether they s h o u l d  b e  s t a r t e d  u p  o r  c l o s e d  d o w n  
(Chandler, 1982). 
While the financial perspective is more appropriate in the case of the largest 
groups, the organizational perspective appears to be more useful for explaining the 
existence and the characteristics of small and medium sized groups. Thus, in this paper 
we consider the group as being the appropriate unit to delimit the firm’s boundary; i.e. 
we take business groups as the ‘observed’ organizational form adopted by firms when 
they grow in size.  
Because business groups are complex structures, to identify the geographic location 
and the industry to which they belong we take the largest firm of the group as our 
reference. In some cases it might appear more appropriate to identify these 
characteristics by referring perhaps to the original firm;however, evidence shows that 
both reference points produce approximately the same results.  
2.2  Spatial agglomeration and business groups 
Only recently have the relationships between spatial agglomeration and firm’s 
organization attracted the attention of the economics literature. For example, Rosenthal 
and Strange (2003) examine how corporate organizations affect the benefits that arise 
from clustering within a given industry. Moreover, as Duranton and Puga (2003)   5
argue, up to now little theoretical work has been done on the relationships between 
agglomerations forces and firms’ heterogeneity. This paper is a first attempt to make an 
empirical contribution to this literature, extending an earlier study  by Cainelli et al. 
(2006). 
We characterize agglomeration as membership of groups in industrial districts. In 
these production structures, which are particularly widespread within the Italian 
economy, agglomeration forces such as labour market pooling, local knowledge 
spillovers, face to face contacts, etc. play an important role in enhancing firms’ 
innovative activity and economic performance (Cainelli and Zoboli, 2004). Despite the 
importance of business groups and industrial districts in the Italian economy, until 
recently only a few studies had analysed the relationships between these two 
phenomena (Bianchi and Gualtieri, 1990; Brusco et al., 1996; Dei Ottati, 1996; Brioschi et 
al., 2002). From the point of view of our analysis, these contributions present two main 
drawbacks. First from an empirical point of view, they refer to specific industrial 
districts, making it difficult to assess to what extent their results can be generalized. 
Second from a theoretical point of view, they do not analyse the relationship between 
the nature of agglomeration forces and the presence and features of business groups.  
Some more recent studies have tried to systematically analyse the relationship 
between industrial districts and business groups, taking account of the characteristics 
of the latter (Balloni and Iacobucci, 2001; Brioschi et al., 2002; Brioschi et al., 2004), but 
they do not develop a general framework for the possible relationship between a firm’s 
organization and its belonging to an industrial district. To construct hypotheses about 
the empirical relationships between these phenomena we need further remarks.  
Information sharing about production technology and market needs, transmission 
of ideas, and speed of the imitative process are some of the characteristic features of 
industrial districts and, more generally, of spatial agglomeration of production 
activities. They help firms to increase efficiency and to foster product innovation and 
growth. Moreover, knowledge spillovers and information sharing enhanced by spatial 
proximity allow firms to seize business opportunities along the production chain or in 
related sectors (Cainelli and Leoncini, 1999). At the same time economic geography 
models have shown that specialization can have a negative impact on diversification of 
production activity (Duranton and Puga, 2001). For these reasons the growth processes 
of district firms normally take the form either of product differentiation within the 
same sector, or vertical integration. Both forms concern activities along the district   6
production chain. Moreover, the familiarity of firms within the same district favours 
acquisitions among them (Brioschi et al., 2002). As a result, it is likely that the setting up 
of new firms or the acquisition of established ones will involve firms belonging to the 
same sector of specialization and located within the same district.  
From the previous discussion it emerges that spatial agglomeration forces play a 
role in shaping firms’ growth strategies. Specifically, we can derive the following 
hypotheses: i) business groups, as a result of a firm’s growth process, are more 
widespread within industrial districts than outside them; ii) business groups belonging 
to industrial districts show a higher degree of specialization than groups outside them; 
iii) business groups belonging to industrial districts show a higher degree of spatial 
concentration of their activities. 
2.3  Technology and business groups 
The second aspect investigated in this paper concerns the influence of technology 
on firms’ strategies and organization. Specifically, we focus on vertical integration 
choices.  
There are two main theories explaining the degree of vertical integration: 
transaction cost economics (TCE) and property rights theory (PRT). According to TCE 
(Williamson, 1985) vertical integration occurs as a result of the need to prevent ex-post 
hold-up problems resulting from transaction specific investments. The advantages of 
vertical integration in reducing or avoiding the costs of market transactions must be 
compared with the cost of producing within the firm (cost of integration). The latter 
depends on the ability to monitor employees and convey information within the 
organization.  
In contrast to the TCE approach, which emphasises ex-post transaction problems, 
PRT focuses on distortions in ex-ante investment. The residual rights of control, 
guaranteed by the ownership of assets, are particularly valuable in situations of ex ante 
incomplete contracting and ex post opportunist behaviour. Some of the assumptions 
and conclusions of the two theories are very similar. Nevertheless it has been shown 
that this is not always the case (Whinston, 2001). PRT predictions are more difficult to 
empirically test than TCE theory. This is probably the reason why much of the 
empirical literature on vertical integration is based on TCE, relying on single industry 
case studies. Only a few studies have used a cross industry approach to explore the   7
intensity and the determinants of vertical integration (Fan and Lang, 2000; Acemoglu 
et al., 2004).  
The approach followed by Acemoglu et al. (2004) is particularly interesting in our 
case as they aimed to assess the role of technology in the vertical integration choice. 
Following the property rights approach, their model predicts that: i) backward 
integration (i.e. the control of input suppliers) is positively related to the technological 
intensity of the acquirer and negatively related to the technological intensity of the 
supplier; ii) forward integration (i.e. the control of output acquirer) is positively related 
to the technological intensity of the acquirer and negatively related to the technological 
intensity of the supplier.  
Using TCE theory we should obtain the opposite results as the technology intensity 
of the supplier is positively related to the degree of transaction specificity, thus 
increasing the probability of backward integration. Moreover, TCE also suggests a role 
for spatial agglomeration in vertical integration. Indeed spatial proximity and face to 
face contact, together with social and cultural homogeneity of industrial districts, 
should attenuate opportunistic behaviours thus reducing transaction costs (Dei Ottati, 
1994). This means that, other things being equal, we can expect that groups in 
industrial districts will show a lower degree of vertical integration as they can more 
easily rely on market exchanges with supplier firms.  
H o w e v e r ,  t h i s  n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t  o f  a g g l o m eration on vertical integration could be 
counterbalanced by the action of local knowledge spillovers and information sharing, 
which facilitate the acquisition of resources and competences along the district 
production chain (Brioschi et al., 2002). 
 
 
3. Data and results 
3.1  The data set  
For our empirical analysis we use two different versions – a firm level and a 
business group level – of a new and original data-set on business groups recently   8
developed by ISTAT. The data refer to the year 2001. Merging the information about 
joint stock companies drawn from the Italian industrial census and the first version of 
the firm level data set, we are able to assess the presence of firms belonging to business 
groups by industry and industrial districts. The latter are identified according to the 
Sforzi-ISTAT procedure (ISTAT, 1997). This procedure considers the local labour 
systems (LLS) as the unit of analysis and identifies 199 industrial districts within the 
784 LLS into which the Italian territory is divided.  
The business group version of the data-set was used to study the organizational 
specificity and strategic choices of business groups. To compare district and non-
district groups we isolated the manufacturing groups defined according to the 
following two criteria: i) group composed of at least two production companies (we 
excluded financial and property companies or non-active companies) one of which is a 
manufacturing firm; ii) largest company in the group is a manufacturing firm. The 
industry that a group belongs to is determined by the sector of its largest company. A 
manufacturing group is classified as belonging to a particular industrial district when 
its largest company is located in it, and it operates in the same sector of the district.  
Given these criteria we identified 8,861 manufacturing groups, of which 4,125 
belong to an industrial district. There are 25,739 manufacturing and service firms 
belonging to these business groups, with an average of about 3 firms per group. The 
distribution of business groups by class of employees and number of firms is shown in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1 – Manufacturing business groups by class of employees and number of 
firms 
Class of firms in the group  Class of 
employees  2 3  4-5  6-9  10-49  50-99  >99 
Total 
1-9  732 138  24  2        896 
10-19  893 234  60  8        1,195 
20-49  1,604 546  196  34  9      2,389 
50-99  815 461 270  63  18      1,627 
100-249  542 395 337 118  42      1,434 
250-499  117 123 156 110  58      564 
500-999  49 45 67 77 63  3    304 
> 999  20 26 40 51  100  12  3  252 
Total 4,772  1,968  1,150  463  290  15  3  8,661 
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It should be noted that according to other statistical sources the number of 
manufacturing business groups is higher than that identified using the ISTAT data-set. 
Referring to the same year, Unioncamere (2004, p. 96) estimates about 16,000 groups as 
belonging to the manufacturing sector. Both data-sets are built taking into 
consideration joint stock companies and adopting the same definition of control: i.e. 
the ownership of at least 50% of the shares. The discrepancy is due to the way in which 
the ‘raw’ data have been elaborated. For our analysis we exclude what we call ‘pseudo-
groups’ – i.e. groups with one production company and one or more financial 
companies - and groups composed of mostly foreign companies and only one Italian 
company because the ISTAT data-set lacks information (employees, activity, etc.) about 
foreign companies. We also only consider business groups with at least two ‘active’ 
companies.  
3.2  The presence and organizational specificity of business groups in 
industrial districts  
The first result of our analysis concerns the presence of business groups within 
Italian industrial districts. The empirical evidence shows that business groups are more 
widespread within industrial districts than outside them, thus confirming the findings 
of previous contributions on this issue (Brioschi et al., 2002). In particular, columns 1 
and 2 of Table 2 suggest that, passing from non-district to district LLSs, the share of 
firms belonging to business groups tends to increase. In the first case, the share of total 
firms is equal to 21.31%, whereas in the second it increases to 23.88%. This finding 
appears to be reinforced when we take into account only those firms specialized in the 
district sector. In fact, in this case the share of firms belonging to a business group is 
higher than in the two previous cases.    10
 
Table 2 - Firms belonging to a business group (2001), % of firms 
 Firms  Employees 
  (c)/(a) (c)/(b) (c)/(a) (c)/(b) 
      
Non-district LLSs (585)  4.63  21.31  44.94  63.47 
District LLS (199)  5.87  23.88  35.39  53.05 
Industrial district  (199)  5.86  24.11  35.67  53.28 
(a) All firms 
(b) Joint stock companies 
(c) Firms belonging to a business group 
 
Table 3 - Firms belonging to a business group by sector of activity (2001), % of firms 
  District firms  Non-district firms 
 (c)/(a)  (c)/(b)  (c)/(a)  (c)/(b) 
        
Food (17)  5.67  20.61  2.69  17.75 
Textile and clothing  (68)  5.01  21.82  3.09  17.43 
Leather and footwear (28)  4.06  15.92  2.83  14.73 
Furniture (39)  4.91  25.33  2.39  18.66 
Mechanics (33)  7.46  25.77  5.43  22.31 
Other sectors (14)  7.23  20.99  9.27  26.27 
(a) All firms 
(b) Joint stock companies 
(c) Firms belonging to a business group 
 
The greater incidence of business groups within Italian industrial districts is further 
confirmed by Table 4, where the analysis takes into account industrial districts by 
sector of activity. From this evidence we find that, with the exception only of districts 
operating in ‘other sectors’, the presence of business groups is always greater in district 
rather than non-district firms. For example, in the food industry the share of firms 
belonging to a business group increases, passing from non-district to district firms. In 
the latter case the share is equal to 5.67%, when measured as the ratio of all firms, and 
to 20.61% when measured with respect to joint stock companies. Similar evidence was 
found for the other manufacturing sectors. In the textile and clothing sector the share 
goes from 3.09% for non-district firms to 5.01% for district firms, while in the leather 
and footwear sector the share rises from 2.83% to 4.06%. The result is the same when 
the presence of business groups is measured as the ratio between firms belonging to a 
business group and joint stock companies. 
For the purposes of this paper the higher presence of groups is more significant 
when measured in terms of firms than in terms of employees. This means that in 
industrial districts the group form is more widespread among smaller firms, while    11
outside industrial districts the presence of the groups is more dependent on firm size. 
Indeed, industrial districts are characterized, by definition, by the presence of small 
and medium-sized firms, while in non-district areas large firms can be localized. 
 
Table 4 - Firms belonging to business groups (2001), % of employees 
 
District firms  Non-district 
firms 
 (c)/(a)  (c)/(b)  (c)/(a)  (c)/(b) 
        
Food (17)  51.73  64.69  32.34  57.57 
Textiles and clothing  (68)  29.80  49.89  28.65  50.15 
Leather and footwear (28)  17.29  31.47  20.66  38.36 
Furniture (39)  41.54  61.14  25.30  49.00 
Mechanics (33)  42.19  57.36  40.77  57.46 
Other sectors (14)  36.36  50.43  51.60  64.72 
(a) All firms 
(b) Joint stock companies 
(c) Firms belonging to a business group 
 
 
So far we have shown that the presence of business groups is higher in district than 
in non-district areas. Now we empirically assess the existence of a link between spatial 
agglomeration and firms’ organization. In other words, we intend to verify whether 
district groups show an organizational specificity with respect to business groups 
operating in non-district areas. To perform this analysis we calculate two different 
indicators: (i) a specialization index and (ii) a spatial concentration index. The index of 
the degree of specialization of groups is computed as the ratio of overall employees of 
the group that belongs to the same sector of the largest firm (which in the case of the 
district group is the same as the district sector). Although this is not a proper index of 
diversification, it is appropriate for the hypothesis being investigated: i.e., that groups 
in industrial districts tend to expand their activities in the sector characterizing the 
district.  
The index of spatial concentration is calculated as the ratio of overall employees of 
the group belonging to firms located in the same LLS.   
To test the hypothesis of organizational specificity of district groups we calculate, 
for both indicators, t-tests of mean differences between district and non-district groups. 
The findings are shown in Table 5 and Table 6. InTable 5 we find in particular that the 
degree of diversification of groups is very low, both for district and non-district 
groups. Nevertheless, the degree of specialization of business groups located in   12
industrial districts is significantly higher than that of groups located outside industrial 
districts, thus confirming Brioschi et al.’s (2002, 2004) hypothesis that there is a 
prevalence in industrial districts of a specific organizational form of business group 
which they define as a ‘district group’.   






Test of diff. 
of means 
 (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  t 
Sig. 
(1 tail) 
            
Food (17)  46  .89  685  .87  .48  .316 
Textiles and clothing  (68)  477  .92  545  .89  3.08***  .001 
Leather and footwear (28)  141  .93  178  .89  2.82***  .003 
Furniture (39)  39  .89  82  .83  1.76**  .040 
Mechanics (33)  826  .92  3329  .90  3.43***  0.001 
Other sectors (14)  197  .91  2516  .88  2.59***  0.005 
(1) Number of business groups  
(2) Degree of specialization of business group  
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
 






Test of diff. 
of means 
 (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  t 
Sig. 
(1 tail) 
            
Food (17)  46  .87  685  .90  -1.51  .066 
Textiles and clothing  (68)  477  .94  545  .91  2.88***  .002 
Leather and footwear (28)  141  .94  178  .93  .71  .241 
Furniture (39)  39  .96  82  .92  1.52*  .065 
Mechanics (33)  826  .92  3329  .91  1.05  .148 
Other sectors (14)  197  .92  2516  .92  .19  .424 
(1) Number of business groups  
(2) Degree of specialization of business group  
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
 
 
Table 6 shows that the degree of spatial concentration is very high for both types of 
groups. Also in this case it is due to the large number of small groups, whose firms are 
mainly located around the largest one. With the exception of the food groups the share 
of employees within the same LLS is higher in district groups than in non-district ones. 
Nevertheless, the difference between the mean values is statistically significant only for 
business groups belonging to textile and clothing districts (Table 6).  
    13
3.3  The presence of business groups by industry and Pavitt’s sectors  
We now examine the presence of business groups by industry and Pavitt 
sectors. This is a preliminary for the next analysis, where we use industries as proxies 
for technology. Our hypothesis is that the technological regimes that characterize 
industries influence the organization of firms and therefore the relative presence of 
business groups. In order to identify those industries where this presence is higher, in 
Table 7 and Table 8  we report the distribution of this phenomenon by industries and 
by class of employees. More specifically,  Table 7 shows the incidence of business 
groups in terms of firms, while Table 8 presents the latter in terms of employees. The 
presence of business groups is particularly relevant in some industries such as (i) 
Chemicals and Allied Products (24,5% in terms of firms and 66,3% in terms of 
employees), (ii) Petroleum Refining and Related Industries (28,4% in terms of firms 
and 74,9% in terms of employees) and (iii) Transportation Equipment  (26,5%7 in terms 
of firms and 71,4% in terms of employees). In other industries, such as (i) Lumber and 
Wood Products, (ii) Leather and footwear, and (iii) Miscellaneous Manufacturing 
Industries the presence of groups is low. It should be clear that the prevalence of 
business groups within an industry is generally associated with the presence of specific 
technological features. In other words, this evidence suggests that in high and medium 
tech sectors business groups often represent a more efficient solution for firms’ 








   14
Table 7 – Firms belonging to groups by industry and class of employees (% on total 
firms)  
Industry  Class of employees 
 1-49  50-249  250-999  1000- 
Total 
Food, Beverages and Tobacco  15,1 47,9 71,9 93,8 18,3 
Textile and clothing  13,7 38,7 73,0 90,0 16,8 
Leather and footwear  10,9 30,6 71,0  100,0  13,1 
Lumber and Wood Products (Ex. Furniture)  10,4 34,9  100,0    12,3 
Paper, printing and publishing  18,6 49,7 80,6 83,3 20,9 
Petroleum Refining and Related Industries  23,9 54,8 60,0 80,0 28,4 
Chemicals and Allied Products  24,5 47,4 80,0 82,8 29,5 
Rubber and Plastic Products  17,8 47,2 80,4 50,0 21,7 
Stone, Clay, Glass and Concrete Products  16,3 44,9 80,0 91,7 19,7 
Metal products  14,7 38,9 66,3 92,9 17,2 
Industrial Machinery   19,0 45,5 76,1 82,4 22,6 
Computer and electronics   17,2 45,9 70,6 82,9 20,4 
Transportation Equipment  20,2 48,6 54,3 82,1 26,5 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries  13,2 34,2 66,7  100,0  15,2 
Total  16,1 42,6 72,3 84,0 19,2 
 
These considerations are confirmed when we analyse the distribution of groups 
by class of employees. Table 8 illustrates the role of firm size in explaining differences 
in the presence of business groups. In all the industries considered the presence of 
groups is modest among small firms, and tends to increase with size. It is not by pure 
chance that all large industries (units with more than 1,000 employees) show a 
presence of groups equal to 84% in terms of firms and equal to 90.2% in terms of 
employees. 
We now turn to the analysis of business groups by Pavitt sectors. Also in this case, 
the role of technology is clear. As can be seen from the analysis of Tables 6 and 7, the 
presence of business groups is particularly relevant in the ‘science-based’ (24,2% in 
terms of firms and 68,7% in terms of employees) and ‘scale-intensive’ sectors (21,4% in 
terms of firms and 53,3% in terms of employees), and, to a minor extent, in ‘specialized 
suppliers’ industries (21,4% in terms of firms and 49,4% in terms of employees). 
However, the presence of this organizational form in ‘dominated supplier’ sectors (16% 
in terms of firms and 39,3% in terms of employees) does not reach the values of the 
other Pavitt sectors. 
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Table 8 – Firms belonging to groups by industry and class of employees (% on total 
employees) 
Industry  Class of employees 
 1-49  50-249  250-999  1000- 
Total 
Food, Beverages and Tobacco  19,7 51,8 78,8 90,9  53,1 
Textile and clothing  17,4 43,6 73,9 94,8  41,4 
Leather and footwear  12,7 35,7 71,7  100,0  30,1 
Lumber and Wood Products (Ex. Furniture)  11,9  37,3  100,0  25,3 
Paper, printing and publishing  22,7 53,8 84,2 99,9  50,2 
Petroleum Refining and Related Industries  28,8 59,2 56,0 98,7  74,9 
Chemicals and Allied Products  31,6 49,6 83,2 88,3  66,3 
Rubber and Plastic Products  21,1 51,2 83,9 40,6  42,6 
Stone, Clay, Glass and Concrete Products  21,0 49,5 79,9 89,1  48,9 
Metal products  17,4 43,4 68,7 99,1  39,3 
Industrial Machinery   22,3 49,1 76,6 84,5  50,7 
Computer and electronics   22,5 50,8 73,3 92,7  56,9 
Transportation Equipment  22,9 49,6 54,9 92,1  71,4 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries  16,0 38,9 69,8  100,0  32,5 
Total  19,5 46,9 74,5 90,2  48,8 
 
 
Table 9 - Firms belonging to business groups by Pavitt sectors (2001) (% on  firms) 
Class of employees 
1-49 50-249  250-999  1000- 
Total 
Dominated supplier  13,3  38,3 71,7 94,9 16,0 
Scale intensive  18,1  45,6 72,6 79,6 21,4 
Science based  20,2  49,1 65,9 89,1 24,2 
Specialized suppliers  18,1  44,7 76,3 78,0 21,4 
Total  16,1  42,6 72,3 84,0 19,2 
 
Table 10 - Firms belonging to business groups by Pavitt sectors (2001) (% on total 
employees) 
Class of employees 
  1-49 50-249  250-999  1000- 
Total 
Dominated supplier  16,3  43,0 73,4 94,8  39,3 
Scale intensive  21,5  49,7 75,6 87,2  53,3 
Science based  27,7  53,6 70,4 94,9  68,7 
Specialized suppliers  21,7  48,1 76,3 88,5  49,4 
Total  24,0 58,6  93,1 107,1  60,1 
 
3.4 Agglomeration, technology and vertical integration 
The aim of this section is to analyse, from an econometric point of view, the 
relationship existing at business group level between vertical integration on the one   16
hand, and technology and spatial agglomeration, on the other. Thus, we complete our 
analysis by investigating the joint role of agglomeration and technology in shaping 
firms’ organization. 
To assess whether a diversified activity in a group can be considered to be a 
backward or a forward integration we use the Italian input-output tables for 2000 to 
determine when a pair of activities can be considered as part of the same production 
chain. The table contains the value of intermediate exchanges between 58 branches of 
economic activity, 23 of which are manufacturing activities. Indicated by j=1,2,….,58 
the branches of economic activity, for each manufacturing industry i = 1,2,…, 23 we 
calculate the index bij as the share of intermediate consumption of industry i supplied 
by the industry j, so that for each i  1 ij
j
b = ∑ . 
Excluding intra-industry exchanges the combination of the 23 manufacturing 
industries and the 58 potential supplier industries results in 1,311 pairs of activities. 
The larger bij, the larger the share of input requirement controlled by the producer in 
industry i in case of integration with industry j; i.e. bij is an index of the quantitative 
relevance of backward integration. Of the 1,311 potential backward relationships 284 
are null while the others show a positive value. Of these latter, 287 show a value over 
1% and 85 a value over 5%.  We chose the 3% value as a reasonable cut-off value for 
discriminating significant backward vertical relationships among manufacturing 
industries.  
In the case of forward integration, we use a similar procedure. Given j=1,2,….,58 
the branches of potential acquirers, for each manufacturing industry i = 1,2,…, 23 we 
have calculated the index fij as the share of intermediate sales of industry i supplied to 
industry j , so that for each i  1 ij
j
f = ∑ . Of the 1311 potential pairs of activities, there are 
945 with the index fij>0, 255 with fij>0.01 and 97 with fij> 0 . 0 3 .  A s  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
backward integration we chose the 3% value as a reasonable cut-off for discriminating 
significant forward vertical integration between pairs of industries.   
On the basis of this analysis we constructed a dummy variable for each group 
according to the presence within the group of the pair of industries with values of bij 
and vij exceeding the threshold level indicated above. The dummy has the following 
values: 0 = the group is not vertically integrated; 1 = the group is forward integrated: 2 
= the group is backward integrated.   17
Table 8 shows the distribution of manufacturing groups according to the type of 
vertical integration and number of production companies. Given the small number of 
cases we excluded from our analysis groups that were both forward and backward 
integrated.  
Table 11 – Manufacturing groups by type of vertical integration within the 
















2 5,008  287  368    5,663 
3 1,270  123  188  4  1,585 
4-5 591  89  139  10  829 
6-9 228  53  60  16  357 
10-49 103  31  52  17  203 
50- 4 6  2  12  24 
Total 7,204 589  809  59  8,661 
 
 
The econometric analysis is carried out using as the dependent variable the dummy 
variable previously defined. It is clear that this dependent variable is unordered since 
the numerical values associated with each vertical integration strategy are arbitrary in 
the sense that 0 < 1 < 2 does not imply that outcome 1 (no vertical integration at all) is 
less than outcome 2 backward integration, and so on. We assume that there are 
basically two explanatory variables that might explain these business groups’ vertical 
integration strategies: i.e., technology, captured in the following analyses by Pavitt’s 
and industry dummies, and spatial agglomeration, captured by the a business group 
belonging to any Italian industrial district and by an urbanization economy measure 
such as the natural log of population density in 1996 at the LLS level. In the case of 
industrial districts, we use the dummy (Dis) for all the Italian industrial districts and 
dummies for specific districts, such as food districts (Dis_food), textiles and clothing 
districts (Dis_tex), leather and footwear districts (Dis_lea)  furniture districts (Dis_furn), 
mechanics districts (Dis_mec) and districts operating in other industries (Dis_oth). 
Finally, in order to eliminate (at least partially) business groups’ unobservable fixed 
effects we introduce in our econometric specifications group size variables captured, 
ifirst by the natural log of the number of firms belonging to a group and then by the 
natural log of the number of groups’ employees.     18
As micro-econometrics tells us, the best way to model these three groups’ vertical 
integration choices is by multinomial logit. Following Greene (2003), in this model the 
estimated equations provide a set of probabilities for the J choices for a decision maker 
– in our case, Italian business groups – with characteristics  i x . In particular, this 
econometric methodology assumes that the probabilities for these J choices can be 























where  0 = i Y  if the business group i is not vertically integrated,  1 = i Y  if it is 
forward integrated, and finally if  2 = i Y  it is backward integrated.  
The results of this econometric investigation are reported in Table 12. As far as 
technology is concerned, all Pavitt’s dummies are always statistically significant but 
with different signs. In the case of forward integration they are all negative, while in 
the case of backward integration they are positive in the case of specialized supplier 
and science based sectors and negative in the case of the dominated supplier sectors. 
This result shows the difficulty for firms belonging to dominated supplier sectors to 
control backward production phases, thus confirming the role of innovative regimes in 
influencing backward vertical integration choices. In the case of forward integration it 
emerges that all the estimated Pavitt dummy variables are negative against the scale 
intensive sector, thus suggesting an important role of firm size in determining this 
choice. This finding is confirmed by the positive and significant coefficients of variables 
capturing group size.  
With regard to spatial agglomeration, the district dummy is positive and 
statistically significant in the case of both forward and backward integration. This 
means that agglomeration, captured in our analysis by membership of firms in 
industrial districts, positively affects the vertical integration strategies adopted by 
Italian business groups. This suggests the prevalence of local knowledge spillovers and 
information sharing effects with respect to the lowering of transaction costs.  
However, the analysis referring to a specific typology of Italian districts shows that 
these agglomeration effects are industry-specific. Indeed, the dummy for mechanics   19
districts is positive and statistically significant in all the forms of vertical integration 
considered while, with the exception of other districts in the case of backward 
integration, the dummies for the other types of districts are never statistically 
significant.   
In this sense district dummies seem to capture industry effects rather than 
agglomeration effects; the latter are better captured by the LLS population size which is 
a proxy for the intensity of urban agglomeration economies.  
Table 12 - Vertical integration, agglomeration and technology: estimates 
 Multinomial  Logit(a) Multinomial  Logit(a) 
        
1 – forward integration  Coefficent  t values  Coefficent  t values 
Specialized supplier  -0.889** -6.17 -0.905** -6.25 
Science based  -0.750**  -3.63  -0.784**  -3.61 
Scale intensive  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
Dominated supplier  -0.685**  -6.95  -0.647**  -6.45 
Log (number of firms’ group)  0.586**  6.68  0.593**  6.72 
Log (number of group’s employee)  0.275**  8.07  0.274**  8.03 
Log (population density) in 1996  -0.073*  -1.72  -0.085**  1.99 
Dis 0.218**  2.42  …  … 
Dis_food …  …  0.131  0.46 
Dis_tex …  …  0.069  0.48 
Dis_lea …  …  0.067  0.27 
Dis_mech …  …  0.501**  4.20 
Dis_oth …  …  0.069  0.48 
        
2 – backward integration         
Specialized supplier  1.246** 13.12 1.245** 13.10 
Science based  0.473**  3.08  0.473**  3.07 
Scale intensive  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
Dominated supplier  -0.584**  -5.18  -0.562**  -4.97 
Log (number of firms’ group)  0.678**  8.68  0.683**  8.75 
Log (number of group’s employee)  0.268**  8.71  0.267**  8.67 
Log (population density) in 1996  -0.038  -1.04  -0.047  -1.28 
Dis 0.205**  2.55  …  … 
Dis_food …  …  -0.036  -0.14 
Dis_tex …  …  0.116  0.97 
Dis_lea …  …  -0.165  -0.67 
Dis_mech …  …  0.328**  3.07 
Dis_oth …  …  0.261**  2.09 
        
        
N. Obs.  8594  8594 
Pseudo R2  0.095 0.097 
(a) The regression also includes a constant term 
Legend: ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
Note: t values are in parentheses 
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper set out to analyse the relationships between certain structural variables, 
such as spatial agglomeration and technology, and firms’ strategy and organization. 
Despite the relevance of this research line for understanding the behaviour of firms, up   20
to now only a few contributions have attempted to provide theoretical explanations 
and empirical evidences on these topics.  
Our work contributes to this literature in three ways. First, we show that spatial 
agglomeration influences the growth patterns of business groups and affects their 
presence in industrial districts. Second, we show that the organizational specificity of 
business groups partially depends on their belonging to industrial districts. Finally, we 
detect the joint influence of spatial agglomeration and technology on firms’ vertical 
integration decisions. 
More specifically, we have shown that the incidence of business groups in 
industrial districts is higher than in non-district areas and also thatwhat matters is not 
simply belonging to an industrial district, but the ‘size’ of the local system and the 
strength of agglomeration forces. We also were able to detect the role of spatial 
concentration of production in shaping some features of firms’ organization; indeed, 
groups belonging to industrial districts are less diversified and show a higher degree of 
spatial concentration. This means that agglomeration affects the growth process of 
‘district groups’ around the district’s core business.  
The greater incidence of business groups within the Italian industrial districts can 
be explained on the basis of the costs to district firms for acquiring information on the 
characteristics of competitors and/or suppliers. These costs are lower in industrial 
districts than in non-district areas, thus fostering acquisitions (Brioschi et al., 2002; 
Brioschi et al., 2004). 
The result on organizational specificity of district groups is interesting. This finding 
suggests that agglomeration forces operating in industrial districts are sector-specific, 
thus confirming the idea that in these production structures knowledge spillovers are 
of intra-industry type, or ‘a là Porter’, as suggested in some recent urban economics 
contributions (Glaeser et al., 1992; Cainelli and Leoncini, 1999). For this reason, spatial 
agglomeration seems to affect the growth/specialization processes of district groups 
around the district core business rather than fostering their spatial concentration. 
Finally, we find that these results are not homogeneous across industrial districts, 
being strongly affected by the industry in which the district is specialized. Specifically, 
the influence of agglomeration forces is particularly significant for mechanics districts 
but not for districts specialized in the so called ‘traditional industries’.  
This latter result questions the role of technology in these processes. We analysed 
how technology and innovation regimes influence the presence and growth strategy of   21
business groups. Empirical evidence shows that there is a high heterogeneity in the 
presence of business groups by industry and Pavitt sectors. Specifically, we found that 
business groups are more widespread in high and medium-tech industries than in 
traditional industries. Because the group is the outcome of a growth process, the 
learning mechanisms and knowledge base characterizing firms belonging to the former 
industries can facilitate their ability to enter into new business activities.  
Finally, some aspects of firms’ strategy, such as the degree and direction (backward 
or forward) of vertical integration were analysed. The control of the different stages of 
the production chain is one of the main strategic choices made by firms and one that 
strongly affects their organizational structure. Our empirical evidence shows that 
vertical integration is conditioned by technology. Specifically the technology intensity 
of the supplying industry shows a positive role in influencing backward integration. 
This result is consistent with the TCE approach, as the technology intensity of suppliers 
can be considered a good proxy for the ‘specificity’ of firm transactions, as opposed to 
the property rights approach adopted by Acemoglu et al. (2004). In the case of the 
technology intensity of the acquiring sector the positive role of this variable in 
determining backward vertical integration is confirmed.  
We also detected the joint role of spatial agglomeration and technology in affecting 
firm’s vertical integration decisions. Contrary to common opinion that low transaction 
costs favour vertical production disintegration within industrial districts our findings 
show that this is not the case, especially with reference to mechanical districts. This 
suggests the important role of technology in influencing the internal organization of 
industrial districts.  
Overall our findings can be considered as a first attempt to investigate the 
relationships between spatial agglomeration forces and technology in shaping firms’ 
strategy and organization. We are aware that further refinements both at theoretical 
and empirical level are needed.  
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